Unsettling: the increase of foreign exchange without settlement risk mitigation

The foreign exchange (FX) market is global, vast, cross-border, and operates 24 hours per day. Its effective functioning facilitates international commerce and is a pillar of a sound financial system. A disruption to the FX market – particularly a materialization of FX settlement risk – could cause panic in markets around the world.1 Despite these understood risks, the Bank for International Settlements’ (BIS) Quarterly Review (December 2019) suggests that FX settlement risk is on the rise. Further, and of note, FX settlement risk is growing in currencies not eligible for settlement in CLS.2

CLS believes now is the time to address and reverse the build-up of FX settlement risk. Without immediate action, FX settlement risk will continue to accumulate and, in parallel, so will the risk to the global financial system. The regulatory community and industry must join forces to reverse the expansion of FX settlement risk before it can inflict damage to markets and the economy more broadly.

This paper outlines the history of FX settlement risk and the response by the industry and regulatory community to date. Specifically, the paper explains:

1 The history of FX settlement risk, including background on CLS’s origin and current activities
2 Growing FX settlement risk
3 Existing obstacles to CLS Settlement currency expansion
4 How to address FX settlement risk

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1 The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), which was renamed the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) in 2014, defines FX settlement risk as the risk that one party to an FX transaction will pay the currency it sold but not receive the currency it bought.
3 CPSS: “Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Transactions” (March 1996), bis.org/cpmi/publ/d17.pdf

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Second, the CPSS called on industry groups to develop multi-currency settlement and netting arrangements to contribute to the risk-reducing efforts of individual banks. Lastly, central banks needed to show their support of industry initiatives and cooperate with these groups to bring about timely, market-wide progress.

Following CPSS’s recommendation, 20 major financial institutions formed a group which, with support from the central bank community, further refined the linked settlement concept – an arrangement involving simultaneous PvP exchange of each of the two legs of an FX transaction – that would eventually lead to the creation of CLS.4 CLS’s FX settlement service (CLSSettlement) went live in September 2002 with 39 settlement members (many of whom were part of the group of 20 financial institutions) and seven currencies. See Figure 2.

Today, CLS’s membership comprises over 70 of the world’s largest financial institutions, and CLS is member-owned. Over 25,000 third parties, primarily buy-side institutions, access CLSSettlement via a number of CLS’s settlement members. CLSsettlement now settles 18 actively traded currencies, and to carry out these operations CLS has accounts with each of those 18 central banks.5

Further, these central banks adjusted their operating hours to accommodate CLS settling in a two-hour settlement window. On average, CLS settles USD6.0 trillion of payment instructions per day. The funding required to settle this amount is determined on a multilaterally netted basis, reducing the amount of liquidity required for settlement by approximately 96 percent.

The global financial crisis of 2008 again reminded the world of the importance of mitigating FX settlement risk. While trading in fixed income, rates, and structured product markets were disrupted or effectively ceased because of counterparty credit concerns, the FX market continued to function smoothly. Major banks continued to trade knowing their trades would settle in CLS with the significant risk mitigation provided by PvP.6

Recognizing this important role in the proper functioning of global FX markets, the United States’ Financial Stability Oversight Council designated CLS Bank International as a systemically important financial market utility (i.e., DFMU) in 2012.7

Recent financial market volatility resulting from the impact of Covid-19 has only reinforced the importance of resilient and well-regulated financial market infrastructures like CLS. In March 2020, CLS volumes reached record-breaking levels. The average value of payments settled daily totalled approximately USD7.0 trillion - about 20 percent higher than normal. CLS processed the added volumes with no issues or delays.

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4 PvP ensures the final transfer of a payment in one currency occurs if and only if the final transfer of a payment in another currency or currencies takes place.
5 Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, Danish krone, euro, Hong Kong dollar, Hungarian forint, Israeli shekel, Japanese yen, Korean won, Mexican peso, New Zealand dollar, Norwegian krone, Singapore dollar, South African rand, Swedish krona, Swiss franc, UK pound sterling and US dollar.
6 Levich: “Why foreign exchange transactions did not freeze up during the global financial crisis: The role of the CLS Bank” (July 2009). voxeu.org/article/clearinghouse-saved-foreign-exchange-trading-crisis
7 CLS Bank International is the legal entity operating CLSSettlement.
Growing FX settlement risk

Although the launch of CLS in 2002 reduced the amount of FX settlement risk in the market, a 2008 CPSS report demonstrated that banks were not mitigating this risk as much as they could and urged banks to do more. The need for an industry response was re-emphasized by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in February 2013 via its “Supervisory guidance for managing risks associated with the settlement of foreign exchange transactions” (commonly referred to as BCBS 241). Following its publication, the BCBS expected banks and national supervisors to implement BCBS 241 in their jurisdictions while also considering the size, nature, complexity, and risk profile of banks’ FX activities. Seven years later, more work is required to implement BCBS 241 into national supervisory practices. The BCBS recognized this shortcoming in October 2019, and publicly acknowledged the need for further measures to mitigate FX settlement risk.9

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The BIS Quarterly Review (December 2019) concluded that a significant portion of the global FX market continues to be settled without PvP protection.10 Of the USD18.7 trillion of daily gross FX payment obligations, USD8.9 trillion of payments (approximately half) are at risk. While the decline in the proportion of FX transactions settled with PvP protection is partly explained by the growth in currencies not currently eligible for settlement in CLS, a significant percentage of trades in CLS-eligible currencies are also settled without PvP protection. Independent analysis reinforces the BIS’s conclusions.11

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5 BIS: “Basel Committee discusses policy and supervisory initiatives and approves implementation reports” (October 2019).
6 CPSS: “Overview of foreign exchange payments and national supervisory practices” (November 2019).
7 CPSS “Progress in reducing foreign exchange settlement risk” (May 2008).
8 BIS: “Basel Committee discusses policy and supervisory initiatives and approves implementation reports” (October 2019).
12 BIS: “Basel Committee discusses policy and supervisory initiatives and approves implementation reports” (October 2019).
13 CPSS: “Overview of foreign exchange payments and national supervisory practices” (November 2019).
14 Principle 1 (legal basis) and Principle 8 (settlement finality) are examples of principles that have been used to assess the risk associated with different FX settlement models.
15 BIS: “Supervisory guidance for managing risks associated with the settlement of foreign exchange transactions” (October 2019).
Addressing FX settlement risk

CLS believes immediate action is required to address the apparent growth of FX settlement risk. Specifically, CLS and the industry more broadly, with support of the regulatory community, should focus efforts on: 1) further promotion and adoption of PvP settlement amongst banks and non-banks; and 2) mitigation of growing FX settlement risk in non-CLS currencies.

1. Promotion and adoption of PvP settlement:
The BIS 2019 Triennial Survey data and the BIS Quarterly Review (December 2019) demonstrate the industry can do more to promote and adopt PvP settlement solutions. One potential course of action is for banks and non-banks to evaluate existing operations and identify which transactions are and are not settling via PvP, and for what reason. Following this type of analysis, these market players would be in a position to consider ways to maximize the use of PvP settlement solutions. Additionally, relevant industry codes or regulatory guidance could be reviewed and amended to further promote PvP as a best practice for market participants.16

2. Solutions for non-CLS currencies
If FX settlement risk in non-CLS currencies is to be mitigated, a fundamental consideration is whether a new model is better than the outright risk taken today by financial market participants in trading these currency pairs. Further, trade-offs and choices in design elements, which must be different to CLSSettlement, should be considered to achieve a model that can be implemented and can maximize broad-based risk mitigation.

Conclusion

Preventing further growth of FX settlement risk is not an impossible task, and mitigation of this risk should be at the forefront of the industry and regulatory agenda globally.

Creating a solution for mitigating FX settlement risk will require evaluation and debate of a number of factors and related questions that include, but are not limited to:

Model: What is the optimal model? Gross settlement versus bilateral netting? Central bank versus commercial bank money?

Finality: What degree of finality is acceptable?

Operator: What type of operator is best placed to run such a system (e.g., oversight arrangements, governance, operations at scale, and network)? Is an industry-led solution more appropriate than a central bank-operated model?

Technology: Should the use of a specific technology be prioritized? Further, how will interoperability be considered? Is there a use case for tokens or central bank digital currencies (i.e., CBDCs)?

Standards: Is a new, separate set of risk management standards required for FMIs? If so, could there be parallel standards for systemically important and other FMIs? How would issues relating to enforceability and settlement finality be addressed? Alternatively, are uniform standards necessary or should focus be placed on connectivity between different local systems?

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Preventing further growth of FX settlement risk is not an impossible task, and mitigation of this risk should be at the forefront of the industry and regulatory agenda globally. While CLS is encouraged by recent acknowledgments that more work is needed to mitigate growing FX settlement risk, a cooperative effort between the industry and regulatory community is required to take this work forward and to ensure its success. Together, the unsettling increase of FX without settlement risk mitigation can be addressed.

16 For example, there may be scope to strengthen Principle 50 of the FX Global Code (relating to FX settlement risk mitigation) to better emphasize the use of PvP settlement solutions.